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THE CONTINUING QUESTIONS REGARDING CITIZEN
SUITS UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT: GWALTNEY
OF SMITHFIELD, LTD. v. CHESAPEAKE BAY
FOUNDATION
Attempting to clean up and prevent further pollution of the nation's
waters, in 1972 Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(Clean Water Act or Act). 1 The Clean Water Act prohibits any person from
releasing pollutants into waterways unless the person has a permit.2 To
accomplish the goals of the Act, Congress has authorized the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and state governments to administer and enforce
the Act. 3 Under a program that the Act refers to as the National Pollutant

1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see International Paper Co. v.
Ouellete, 479 U.S. 481, 492 (1987) (indicating that Congress enacted Clean Water Act to create
program to regulate water pollution and clean up nation's waterways). The Clean Water Act
originated in the 1972 amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Pub. L. No.
92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
Congress amended the Water Pollution Control Act in 1972 to correct several inadequacies in
the prior act. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmu. NEws 3668, 3668-3677 (discussing inadequacies in prior act). Accordingly, Congress replaced state-established water quality standards with effluent limitations as
a means to measure compliance with the Act. Id. at 3675. Effluent limitations are rate,
quantity, and concentration restrictions on the discharge of chemical, physical, and biological
pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (1982). The change from state-established water quality
standards to effluent limitations has enabled federal and state governments to require dischargers to use the best water-pollution control technology available. See S. REP. No. 92-414, 92nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN3. Naws 3668, 3668-3677
(containing legislative history of Clean Water Act). By providing grants and loans for
improvements to waste treatment facilities and requiring monitoring and reporting of compliance with the Act's requirements, the 1972 amendments also attempted to improve problems
of funding and information. Id. at 3676-77. Finally, the 1972 amendments improved enforcement provisions of the Act by permitting the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
states to bring both criminal and civil actions against violators of the Act and by permitting
citizens to sue violators of the Act for injunctive and civil penalty relief. Id. at 3677; see infra
note 3 and accompanying text (discussing EPA and state enforcement provision under Clean
Water Act); infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text (discussing citizen enforcement provision
under Clean Water Act).
2. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The Clean Water Act prohibits persons
from discharging pollutants into waterways without a permit. Id. The Act defines person to
include individuals, corporations, partnerships, state and local governments, and other political
subdivisions. Id. at § 1362(5) (1982).
3. Id. at § 1319. In authorizing the EPA and state agencies to enforce the Act, Congress,
in § 309 of the Clean Water Act, limited the powers and procedures that the EPA and states
follow in enforcing the Act. Id. Procedurally, § 309 requires the EPA and states to send notice
of violations to each other and to the violator. Id. Section 309 permits the EPA, after sending
notice to the violator, to issue compliance orders and take civil action against violators of the
Act. Id. Further, the Administrator of the EPA may seek criminal fines against persons that
willfully or negligently violate the Act. Id. at § 1319(c). Section 402(b) of the Clean Water
Act gives state governments that are granted authority by the EPA to administer the permit
program the same enforcement powers as the EPA. Id. at § 1342(b).
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Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), Congress also has authorized the

EPA and each state to issue permits to applicants that want to release
pollutants into waterways. 4 While holders of NPDES permits may release

specified pollutants into waterways, the holders must comply with the
restrictions in the permits. 5 The permit restricts the type and amount of
pollutants (effluent limitations) that a holder may discharge. 6 To measure
compliance with the effluent limitations in the permit, the Act requires
holders of permits to report the amount and type of pollutants the holder
is discharging by periodically filing discharge monitoring reports (DMRs)
with the state or the EPA. 7 If the permit holder fails to comply with any

condition of the NPDES permit, the holder violates the Clean Water Act.'
To ensure compliance with the provisions of the Clean Water Act,
section 505(a) of the Act authorizes any citizen to bring suit against any
person that the citizen alleges is violating the Act. 9 Under the Clean Water

4. Id. at § 1342(a), (b).
5. Id. at § 1342(a).
6. Id. at § 1311. The citizen suit provision in § 505 states that effluent limitations
include the actual discharge parameters and reporting, record keeping, and testing requirements
of the permit. Id. at § 1365(0; see supra note I (discussing effluent limitations in § 502(11)
of Clean Water Act).
7. Id. at § 1318; EPA Permit Conditions, 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(k)(4) (1987). In addition
to the monitoring requirements of the Act, the EPA has promulgated regulations under the
Clean Water Act that require permit holders to report all monitoring results to the EPA or
state in discharge monitoring reports (DMRs) at intervals the permit specifies. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.41(k)(4) (1987) (describing discharge monitoring report requirements). DMRs are statements that report both the maximum amount of pollutants the permit holder may discharge
under the permit and the actual amount of pollutants the holder has discharged. Id. at §
122.41(j), (k)(4). Under the Clean Water Act, permit holders must report their failure to
comply with any requirement of a permit at the interval the permit specifies for submitting
the DMRs. Id. at § 122.41(k)(4). Permit holders, however, must immediately report any failures
to comply with the permit requirements that affect health or environment. Id.
8. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319, 1365 (1982); see Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109,
1115 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that violations of permit sampling and reporting requirements
are sufficient for maintenance of citizen suits under § 505 of Clean Water Act); Menzel v.
County Utils. Corp., 712 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir.) (holding that courts may hear citizen suits
either for violations of substantive effluent limitations or conditions of NPDES permit,
including reporting violations), reh'g denied, 718 F.2d 120 (1983); Student Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey v. AT & T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1203 (D. N.J. 1985)
(holding that violations of NPDES permits constitute violations of the Clean ,Water Act);
Pymatuning Water Shed Citizens v. Eaton, 506 F. Supp. 902, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (holding
that citizen-plaintiffs do not have to prove actual violations of effluent limitations if citizenplaintiffs prove defendant violated NPDES permit conditions), aff'd, 644 F.2d 995 (3d Cir.
1981).
9. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982). Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act states:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf [1] against any person
...who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under
this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator [of the EPA] or a state
with respect to such a standard or limitation, or ....
Id. (emphasis added).
In addition to the language of § 505(a), the legislative history of the Clean Water Act
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Act Congress confers to federal district courts jurisdiction to hear citizen
suits so long as the citizen-plaintiff has notified the defendant of the alleged

violation and neither the EPA nor any state government has an enforcement
action proceeding against the defendant. 10
Although the Clean Water Act authorizes citizen suits, courts previously

had disagreed on when courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits." The
indicates the purpose and scope of the citizen suit provision. See generally 1 A LEGISLATIvE
HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AMENDMENTS OF 1972 (1973) [hereinafter 1 LEG.
HIST.] (containing legislative reports and documents of 1972 amendments to Clean Water Act);

2A

LEaoisLATIv

HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL AMENDENTS OF

1972 (1973)

[hereinafter 2 LEG. HisT.] (same). The legislative history shows that Congress intentionally and
specifically conferred to citizens or groups standing to sue based on nonproprietary interests,
such as aesthetics and preservation. See 1 LEo. HIST., supra, at 249-250 (containing legislative
reports and documents of 1972 amendments to Clean Water Act). Although the EPA and the
states primarily are responsible for enforcing the Clean Water Act, citizens also may enforce
the Act if the EPA or state agency fails to take enforcement action. S. REP. No. 92-414, 92nd
Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1971), reprinted in 2 LEo. HIST., supra, at 1482. The legislative history
also indicates the intended purpose and extent of citizen-plaintiff enforcement under the Clean
Water Act by referring to § 505 as a provision for use in abating violations of the Act. See
1 LEG. HIST., supra, at 876 (stating that purpose of citizen suits is to abate pollution); 1 LEG.
HIST., supra, at 163 (stating that citizen-plaintiffs may sue polluters to halt pollution).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982). Under the Clean Water Act, citizen-plaintiffs may bring
suit against alleged violators of the Act. Id. at § 1365(a). Before a citizen-plaintiff may file
suit against a defendant, however, § 505(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act requires a citizenplaintiff to give at least 60 days notice of the alleged violation to the alleged violator, the
Administrator of the EPA, and the state where the alleged violation is occurring. Id. at §
1365(b)(1). The legislative history indicates that one of the purposes of the 60 day notice is to
give the EPA or state time to take action against the violator. 1 Leg. Hist., supra note 9, at
179. In discussing the 60 day notice provision required under § 505 of the Clean Water Act,
Senator Muskie stated that Congress did not intend the 60 day notice provision to eliminate
the right of action of citizen-plaintiffs to file suit against defendants that are violating the Act
at the time the citizen-plaintiff gives notice. Id. Senator Muskie further stated that the 60 day
notice provision would not prevent citizen-plaintiffs from seeking appropriate remedies upon
alleging that a person is or was in violation of the Clean Water Act, regardless of whether
the violation is or was occasional, sporadic or continual. Id.; see 2 LEG. HIST., supra note 9,
at 1497-98 (stating that purpose of requiring citizen-plaintiff to give notice is to encourage
agency enforcement of Clean Water Act); 2 Lao. HIST., supra note 9, at 1498 (stating that 60
day notice requirement of § 505(b) gives EPA and states first opportunity to sue alleged
violators of Clean Water Act).
In addition to the 60 day notice provision, § 505(b)(1) of the Clean Water Act restricts
citizen-plaintiffs from filing suit against an alleged violator of the Act if the EPA or state
actively is undertaking a civil or criminal action against the alleged violator for the violations.
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1) (1982). The citizen-plaintiff, however, may intervene as a matter of
right if the EPA or state has filed suit against the alleged violator. Id.
11. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have
given divergent interpretations of when § 505(a) of Clean Water Act confers subject matter
jurisdiction to courts); supra note 9 (discussing citizen suit provision in § 505 of Clean Water
Act); infra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Supreme Court resolution
of discord among circuits concerning when courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under
Clean Water Act). See generally Citizen Suits and Civil Penalties Under the Clean Water Act,
85 MicH. L. REv. 1656 (1987) (discussing various interpretations of § 505(a) of Clean Water
Act before Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney); Note, Citizen Suits Alleging Past Violations
of the Clean Water Act, 43 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1537 (1986) (same).
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controversy arose from the courts' divergent constructions of section 505(a)'s
requirement that a citizen-plaintiff may not file suit against a defendant2
unless the citizen-plaintiff alleges that the defendant is violating the Act.'
In construing the language of the Act, some courts held that a citizen-

plaintiff may file suit against a defendant only if the citizen-plaintiff alleged
that the defendant was violating the Act at the time the citizen-plaintiff

filed suit. 3 Other courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for

12. See infra notes 13-15 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which courts have
given divergent interpretations of when § 505(a) of Clean Water Act confers subject matter
jurisdiction to courts).
13. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Shell Oil, 817 F.2d 1169, 1172 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that
defendant must be violating Clean Water Act at time citizen-plaintiff files suit for court to
have jurisdiction), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 501, reh'g denied, 108 S. Ct. 1065 (1988); Hamker
v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 756 F.2d 392, 395 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant
must violate Act at time citizen-plaintiff files suit for court to have jurisdiction); Sierra Club
v. Copolymer Rubber & Chem. Corp., 621 F. Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (M.D. La. 1985) (dismissing
citizen suit because no violation occurred on date plaintiffs filed suit). Before the Supreme
Court resolved the split among jurisdictions concerning when a court has jurisdiction to hear
a citizen suit, some jurisdictions held that a defendant must be violating the Clean Water Act
at the same time the citizen-plaintiff files suit. See Hamker, 756 F.2d at 395 (holding that
defendant must violate Act at time citizen-plaintiff files suit for court to have jurisdiction).
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Hamker v. Diamond
Shamrock Chem. Co. held that a defendant must be violating the Clean Water Act at the
time the citizen-plaintiff files suit for a court to have jurisdiction under § 505(a) of the Clean
Water Act. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396. In Hamker the plaintiffs sued the defendant for a one
time discharge of oil into a nearby creek. Id. at 394. The defendant denied the allegation and
contended that the court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. Id. On appeal from the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,the Fifth Circuit subsequently
dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 397-99. In dismissing the suit, the Fifth
Circuit interpreted the language of § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act to confer jurisdiction to
a court only if a violator is violating the Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff files suit. Id.; see
33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (providing for citizen suit provision in Clean Water Act). The
Court stated that even though a defendant's past discharge, which violated the Act, has
continuing effects, the past discharge is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction to a court. Hamker,
756 F.2d at 397. In addition, the Fifth Circuit supported its interpretation of § 505(a) by
noting that Congress wrote § 505(a) in the present tense. Id. The court, therefore, reasoned
that Congress intended § 505(a) to apply to current violations rather than past violations. Id.
In addition to the language of § 505 of the Clean Water Act, the Hamker court supported
its interpretation of § 505 by noting that the Clean Water Act grants to the EPA and the
states the primary responsibility to enforce the Act. Id. at 395; see 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1982)
(containing government enforcement provision of Clean Water Act). Accordingly, the Fifth
Circuit noted that § 505 confers secondary powers to citizen-plaintiffs to enforce the Clean
Water Act. Hamker, 756 F.2d at 396. To support the court's conclusion that the Act confers
to the EPA and the states the primary responsibility to enforce the Clean Water Act, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that Congress included the 60 day notice provision in § 505 to give the EPA
and state governments an opportunity to act first and thus ensure that citizen suits only would
supplement the EPA's and states' enforcement powers. Id.
In addition, the Fifth Circuit in Hamker based its holding on the court's concern that a
broader construction of the Act would burden federal courts. Id. at 396. The Fifth Circuit
stated that if a court had jurisdiction to hear the citizen suits in which a citizen-plaintiff
alleged that a defendant committed a past violation, the courts would be overburdened with
cases. Id. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that citizen-plaintiffs would attach pendent
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the Fourth Circuit, held that a citizen-plaintiff may file suit against a
defendant for any violation that occurred before the citizen-plaintiff filed

suit (wholly past violations). 1 4 Finally other courts held that a citizen-plaintiff

state claims to claims under the Clean Water Act, which the citizen-plaintiffs could not
otherwise bring in federal court. Id. In addition, the Hamker court found that the legislative
history of the Clean Water Act indicates that Congress drafted the provisions of § 505 of the
Clean Water Act to avoid burdening federal courts. Id.
14. See Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 313 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under Clean Water Act
for wholly past violations), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987); Student Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey v. AT & T Bell Labs., 617 F. Supp. 1190, 1199 (D. N.J. 1985) (same).
Some jurisdictions held that a citizen-plaintiff may file suit against a defendant for any
violation that occurred before the citizen-plaintiff filed suit (wholly past violation). See
Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 313 (holding that courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under
Clean Water Act for wholly past violations). For example, in Chesapeake Bay Found. v.
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under the Clean Water Act based on wholly
past violations. Id.; see infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text (describing facts of Gwaltney
case). In affirming the decision and reasoning of the district court, the Fourth Circuit stated
that the language and legislative history of the Clean Water Act, particularly the purpose of
§ 505 of the Act, authorized citizen-plaintiffs td maintain suits against alleged violators of the
Clean Water Act for wholly past violations. Id. at 308-313; see infra notes 30-39 and
accompanying text (discussing district court opinion in Gwaltney). In construing the language
of § 505 of the Clean Water Act, the court noted that Congress drafted the language of the
citizen suit provision in the present tense. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 309; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
(1982) (providing for citizen suit provision in Clean Water Act). The Gwaltney court further
recognized that, while Congress also wrote the EPA and state enforcement provisions in the
present tense, no court had questioned the power of the EPA and states to sue for past
violations under the Clean Water Act. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 309; see supra note 3 and
accompanying text (describing EPA and state enforcement provisions under Clean Water Act).
The Fourth Circuit stated that the enforcement powers of citizen-plaintiffs must be equivalent
to the enforcement powers of the government. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 310. Thus, the court
reasoned that permit holders would lose any incentive to comply with the Act if the Act did
not confer enforcement abilities to citizen-plaintiffs that were equivalent to the enforcement
powers of the government. Id. The Gwaltney court also reasoned that certain provisions of §
505 explicitly place restrictions on a citizen-plaintiff's ability to file citizen suits. Id. at 310.
For instance, the court noted that the 60 day notice provision restricts a citizen-plaintiff from
filing suit until after the citizen-plaintiff has given a defendant notice. Id.; see supra note 10
and accompanying text (discussing requirements and legislative history of 60 day notice
provision). The court also noted that the Act disallows citizens from suing alleged violators
of the Act if the EPA or state actively are enforcing the Clean Water Act against the violator.
Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 310; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing § 505(b)(2)
of Act, which prevents citizens from suing violators if EPA and states are diligently enforcing
Act). Based on the restrictions on citizen suits under § 505, the court construed § 505 to
confer jurisdiction to courts to hear citizen suits unless the Act expressly forbids a court to
hear citizen suits. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 310. The Fourth Circuit, therefore, concluded that
Congress intended to permit citizen suits for wholly past violations because § 505 does not
contain any provisions that forbid citizen-plaintiffs from suing defendants for wholly past
violations. Id.
In addition to construing the language of the Act, the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney also
examined the legislative history of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 311-12. While the court
concluded that the legislative history does not conclusively support whether a district court
has jurisdiction to hear citizen suits for either wholly past violations or violations that exist
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may file suit against a defendant by alleging that the defendant was
committing an ongoing violation of the Act.S The Supreme Court in
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation6 resolved the
discord among the courts and held that courts have jurisdiction to hear
at the time a plaintiff filed suit, the court noted statements in the legislative history that
permit citizen suits for wholly past violations. Id. Specifically, the Fourth Circuit relied on a
statement that Senator Muskie made to Congress. Id. at 312; see supra note 10 (discussing
Senator Muskie's statement to Congress concerning when citizens may sue violators of Clean
Water Act). The Gwaltney court interpreted the statement of Senator Muskie to support the
court's construction of § 505(a) that allows courts to hear citizen suits for wholly past
violations. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 312. The Fourth Circuit also specifically rejected the
interpretation of other jurisdictions that § 505(a) only permits citizen suits when a defendant
is violating the Act at the time the plaintiff files suit. Id.; see supra note 13 (discussing Fifth
Circuit's interpretation in Hamker case). Finally, because the Fourth Circuit held that § 505(a)
confers jurisdiction to district courts to hear suits for wholly past violations, the Fourth Circuit
found no reason to rule on the alternative holding that plaintiffs-appellees had alleged in good
faith a continuing violation. Gwaltney, 791 F.2d at 308 n.9. The Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney,
therefore, affirmed the decision of the district court and penalized the defendant-appellant for
wholly past violations. Id. at 316-317.
15. See Pawtuxet Cove Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 807 F.2d 1089, 1094 (1st Cir.
1986) (holding that citizen-plaintiff must allege ongoing violation of Clean Water Act by
defendant for court to have jurisdiction), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 484 (1987); Moreco Energy,
Inc. v. Penberthy-Houdaille, 682 F. Supp. 931, 933 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (same). Other jurisdictions
held that a citizen-plaintiff must allege that the defendant is committing an ongoing violation
of the Act. See Pawtuxet, 807 F.2d at 1094 (holding that citizen-plaintiff must allege ongoing
violation of Clean Water Act for court to have jurisdiction). For example, in Pawtuxet Cove
Marina, Inc. v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
held that a citizen-plaintiff must allege that a likelihood exists that a defendant will continue
to violate the Clean Water Act to confer jurisdiction to a court to hear the case. Id. In
Pawtuxet the defendant was a holder of a NPDES permit. Id. at 1090-91. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had discharged excessive pollutants into a river violating the defendant's
NPDES permit. Id. at 1091. The defendant contended that if the defendant had violated the
Act, the violations took place before the plaintiff filed suit. Id. The defendant further contended
that the Clean Water Act did not authorize citizen suits based on wholly past violations. Id.
at 1092. The defendant, therefore, contended that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the
suit because all of the defendant's violations occurred before the plaintiff filed suit. Id.
On appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, the
First Circuit in Pawtuxet found that § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act does not authorize
citizen suits in which a citizen-plaintiff only alleges wholly past violations. Id.; see 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(a) (1982) (providing for citizen suit provision in Clean Water Act). The First Circuit
interpreted § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act to confer subject matter jurisdiction to a court
if the citizen-plaintiff alleges that the defendant committed an ongoing violation. Pawtuxet,
807 F.2d at 1094. In so construing the Act, the First Circuit noted that the 60 day notice
provision in § 505(b) makes filing suit on the day of defendant's violation impossible for
plaintiffs. Id. at 1093. Accordingly, the First Circuit reasoned that § 505(a) of the Clean Water
Act authorizes citizen suits if a defendant currently is violating the Clean Water Act, or if a
citizen-plaintiff reasonably believes that a defendant would continue to violate the Act in the
future. Id. at 1094. Moreover, the court stated that a court has jurisdiction to hear a suit if
a citizen-plaintiff alleges an ongoing violation, even though a current violation does not exist
at the time the citizen-plaintiff files suit. Id. In Pawtuxet the court found that no likelihood
remained that violations would continue because the defendant had connected to a municipal
waste system and was no longer discharging directly into the river. Id.
16. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987).
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citizen suits if the citizen-plaintiff alleges that the defendant is committing
an ongoing violation of the Act. 17 The Supreme Court defined an ongoing
violation as either a continuing or intermittent violation and stated that a
court has jurisdiction to hear citizen suits even if no violation occurs on
the date the citizen-plaintiff files suit.' 8 While the Supreme Court's holding
resolved the courts' conflicting interpretations of section 505(a), the language
of the Gwaltney opinion has created uncertainty for other courts in implementing the holding.' 9 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision, courts
must decide whether to award penalties for precomplaint violations to a
citizen-plaintiff who shows an ongoing violation within the meaning of
Gwaltney.20 In addition, courts must struggle with the Gwaltney decision in
determining when an intermittent violation ceases to be intermittent and
2
becomes a wholly past violation. '
In Gwaltney the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and National Resources
Defense Council (plaintiffs or appellees or respondents) filed suit against
Gwaltney of Smithfield (defendant or appellant or petitioner) in 1984 for
violating the conditions of the defendant's NPDES permit. 22 The Common-

17. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 381
(1987) (holding that citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing violation for courts to have jurisdiction under § 505 of Clean Water Act); supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing
split among jurisdictions in construing § 505(a) of Clean Water Act); infra notes 41-62 and
accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Supreme Court decision). See generally Clearwater &
DuBoff, Arguing for the Defense After Gwaltney, 18 EwnvL. L. RaP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10123
(April 1988) (discussing effect of Gwaltney decision on citizen suits under Clean Water Act);
Miller, Invitation to the Dance of Litigation, 18 ENvTL. L. RP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10098 (March
1988) (analyzing Supreme Court's Gwaltney decision); Powers, A Citizen's View of Gwaltney,
18 ENvTsL. L. REP. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10119 (April 1988) (discussing effect of Gwaltney decision
on citizen suits under Clean Water Act).
18. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381; see infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (discussing
Gwaltney Supreme Court's explanation of continuing and intermittent violations).
19. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381 (holding that citizen-plaintiff must allege ongoing
violation for courts to have jurisdiction under § 505 of Clean Water Act); supra notes 11-15
and accompanying text (describing split among jurisdictions in construing § 505 of Clean
Water Act); infra notes 64-107 and accompanying text (discussing new problems for courts to
address because of Gwaltney holding).
20. See infra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (analyzing appropriateness of penalties
for precomplaint violations and manner in which courts have resolved this issue).
21. See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (discussing factors courts have delineated to determine when intermittent violation ceases to be intermittent violation and becomes
wholly past violation).
22. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1544
(E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987). In
Gwaltney the Chesapeake Bay Foundation and the Natural Resources Defense Council (the
plaintiffs or appellees or respondents), nonprofit organizations that are committed to protecting
natural resources, filed suit against Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. (the defendant or appellant
or petitioner) for violating a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit.
Id. at 1544. The Chesapeake Bay Foundation is a regional organization with more than 19,000
of its members residing in the Chesapeake Bay Area of Virginia and Maryland. Id. The
Natural Resources Defense Council is a national organization with over 800 of the Natural
Resource Defense Council members residing in Virginia. Id.
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wealth of Virginia had granted a permit to the defendant authorizing the

defendant to discharge treated waste from a Virginia meat processing plant
into the Pagan River. 23 The permit established effluent limitations and
required the defendant to maintain records and to file monthly DMRs with
the Commonwealth of Virginia. 24 Despite the requirements of the permit,
the defendant repeatedly violated the permit during a four year period. 2

Throughout the four year period, the defendant, in an effort to comply
with the requirements of the permit, installed new equipment that reduced
the defendant's violations of the NPDES permit. 26 The defendant's last

recorded violation occurred in May 1984, one month before plaintiffs filed
suit against the defendant. 27
In June 1984 plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant

had violated the NPDES permit and would continue to violate the NPDES
permit after the plaintiffs filed suit.29 Relying on DMRs that evidenced past

23. Id. The defendant in Gwaltney, Gwaltney of Smithfield Ltd., discharged treated
waste from a meat processing plant it purchased from ITT-Continental Baking Co. in 1981.
Id. In acquiring the plant, the defendant assumed all of the obligations under the NPDES
permit of ITT-Continental Baking Co. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987); see supra notes 4-8
and accompanying text (describing NPDES permit program). At the time the defendant in
Gwaltney purchased the plant from ITT-Continental Baking Co., the defendant knew that the
plant had a long history of violating the NPDES permit. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1545.
24. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1544-1545.
25. Id. at 1545. In Gwaltney the defendant repeatedly violated the limitations set forth
in the NPDES permit. Id. For example, the defendant violated the total Kjeldahl nitrogen
(TKN) limitation 87 times, the chlorine limitation 34 times, and the fecal coliform limitation
31 times during a four year period. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
108 S. Ct. 376, 378 (1987).
26. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379. In Gwaltney the defendant in March 1982 upgraded
the chlorination system for the plant in an effort to comply with the NPDES permit effluent
limitations. Id. In addition, the defendant installed a new waste water treatment system in
October 1983. Id. By installing new equipment, the defendant reduced and eventually eliminated
all violations of defendant's NPDES permit. Id. at 379.
27. Id. In Gwaltney the defendant's efforts to comply with the effluent limitations in
the defendant's NPDES permit resulted in the last violation of the permit occurring in May
1984, one month before the plaintiffs filed suit. Id. Specifically, the defendant's efforts to
comply with the permit resulted in the last chlorine violation occurring in October 1982, the
last fecal coliform violation occurring in February 1984, and the last TKN violation occurring
in May 1984. Id. The defendant, therefore, did not violate the NPDES permit at the time or
after the plaintiffs filed suit. Id. at 379.
28. Id. at 380. Before filing suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia in June 1984, the plaintiffs in Gwaltney sent notice in February 1984 to
the defendant of the plaintiffs' intent to file suit against defendant for allegedly violating the
NPDES permit. Id. at 379. In addition, the plaintiffs sent notice to the EPA and the state of
Virginia. Id.; see supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing requirements and legislative
history of notice provision in § 505(b) of Clean Water Act).
29. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 380. Although the plaintiffs in Gwaltney alleged that the
defendant had violated and would continue to violate the permit, the plaintiffs limited the
allegations in the complaint to the violations that the defendant was allegedly responsible for
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violations of the permit by the defendant,30 the district court granted partial
summary judgment for the plaintiffs. 31 After the court granted summary

judgement, but before the trial to decide a remedy for the defendant's
violations, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the action, alleging that
the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 32 The defendant argued that
the language of the Clean Water Act prevented a citizen-plaintiff from filing

suit under the Act unless the defendant was violating the Act at the time
the citizen-plaintiff filed the suit. 33 The defendant reasoned that the court

lacked jurisdiction because the defendant's last violation had occurred a
month before the plaintiffs filed suit.3 4 On the other hand, the plaintiffs
contended that the Clean Water Act permits citizen-plaintiffs to maintain a
suit even though the defendant was not violating the Act at the time the
citizen-plaintiffs filed suit.s Having reviewed the motions of the defendant
and the plaintiffs, the district court in Gwaltney held that section 505(a) of
the Clean Water Act does not require a citizen-plaintiff to allege that a
defendant is violating the Act at the time the plaintiff files suit.3 6 The court

concluded that citizen-plaintiffs may maintain suits for wholly past violations. 37 In the alternative, the district court noted that even if section 505(a)

after the defendant acquired the plant. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1545; see supra note 23
and accompanying text (stating that ITT-Continental Baking Co. had history of violating
NPDES permit before defendant acquired plant and assumed obligations under permit).
30. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1545. The district court in Gwaltney granted partial
summary judgment based on the defendant's numerous violations of the NPDES permit. Id.
at 1544. The defendant violated substantive effluent limitations, which the defendant reported
in the defendant's DMRs. Id. at 1544-45. The DMRs contained results of the defendant's
testing, which indicated that the defendant had not complied with the permit and, therefore,
violated the Act. Id. at 1545; see supra note 8 and accompanying text (stating that when
permit holder violates permit, permit holder violates Clean Water Act).
31. Id. at 1544.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1547.
34. Id.; see supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictions that held that
§ 505 of Clean Water Act requires defendant to be violating Act at time citizen-plaintiff files
suit).
35. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp at 1547; see supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing
cases that held that § 505 of Clean Water Act permits citizen suits when citizen-plaintiff alleges
that defendant committed any past or present violation of Act).
36. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (containing section
505(a), citizen suit provision of Clean Water Act).
37. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1550. In ruling on the motions of the plaintiffs and
defendant in Gwaltney, the district court reasoned that the language of § 505 of the Clean
Water Act confers jurisdiction to courts to hear citizen suits for wholly past violations. Id. at
1547-1548; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (providing for citizen suit provision in Clean Water
Act). While noting that the language of § 505 is ambiguous, the court reasoned that a violator
of the Clean Water Act is similar to a taxpayer who fails to pay the full amount of his taxes.
Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1547. The court reasoned that a person who does not pay the full
amount of his taxes remains in violation of the law even though the person pays the full
amount of his taxes the next year. Id. Accordingly, the court reasoned that a defendant who
violates the Clean Water Act remains in violation of the Act even though the defendant later
takes corrective measures to ensure that the defendant complies with the Act in the future.
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of the Clean Water Act required citizen-plaintiffs to allege a current vio-

lation, the plaintiffs in Gwaltney sufficiently had alleged in good faith that
the defendant remained in violation of the Act at the time the plaintiffs
filed the suit.3 Having found that the district court had jurisdiction, the
district court assessed the defendant with penalties of $1,285,322. 39 On
appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
affirmed
4
the decision and adopted the reasoning of the district court.

0

Because the Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney represented one of
three interpretations courts had given section 505(a) of the Clean Water
Act, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine when a court has
jurisdiction to hear a citizen suit under the Act. 41 In vacating the decision
of the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court considered the language of section

505(a). 42 The Court noted that section 505(a) does not precisely state whether
a citizen-plaintiff can file suit only against a defendant that is violating the
Act simultaneously with the filing. 43 The Supreme Court, however, reasoned
that despite the ambiguity of the Act, the most reasonable interpretation of

Id. at 1547; see Student Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. AT & T Bell Labs.,
617 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (D. N.J. 1985) (holding that violating Clean Water Act continues
past date of occurrence).
In addition to construing the language of the Act, the Gwaltney district court found that
the legislative history of the Clean Water Act supported the court's holding. Gwaltney, 611
F. Supp. at 1548-49. The district court noted that a statement which Senator Muskie made
supported the court's holding. Id. at 1548; see supra note 10 (describing statement of Senator
Muskie that indicates extent of jurisdictional grant of § 505 of Clean Water Act). The court
found Senator Muskie's reference to past violations as continuous, occasional or sporadic in
nature indicative of Congress' intent that courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits under
§ 505 of the Clean Water Act for wholly past violations. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1548.
Moreover, in construing the Act and interpreting the legislative history, the district court
noted that it could not practically hold that citizen-plaintiffs must file suit while the defendant
is violating the Act. Id. at 1549. The court reasoned that citizen-plalntiffs rely on the DMRs
to decide whether a defendant is violating the Act and to file a citizen suit. Id. In addition,
the district court noted that citizen-plaintiffs do not have access to DMRs until at least a
month after a defendant discharges pollutants into a waterway. 1d. Accordingly, the court
found that citizen-plaintiffs would find citizen suits impossible to file if § 505 only conferred
jurisdiction to a court when a defendant is violating the Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff files
suit. Id. Thus, the district court held that courts have jurisdiction to hear citizen suits based
on wholly past violations because to hold otherwise would undermine the supplemental
enforcement powers of citizen-plaintiffs under § 505(a). Id.
38. Gwaltney, 611 F. Supp. at 1549 n.8.
39. Id. at 1565; see infra note 71 and accompanying text (describing penalty provisions
of Clean Water Act).
40. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 791 F.2d 304, 316-317 (4th
Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987); see supra note 14 (citing cases holding in accord
with district court in Gwaltney and discussing Fourth Circuit's decision in Gwaltney).
41. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 381 (1987);
see supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing split among jurisdictions in construing
§ 505 of Clean Water Act).
42. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381-383; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (providing for
citizen suit provision in Clean Water Act).
43. Id. at 381; see supra note 9 (quoting language of § 505(a)).

1989]

GWALTNEY OF SMITHFIELD

the Act indicates that section 505(a) does not confer jurisdiction to a court
unless a defendant is violating the Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff files
suit." In so construing the Act, the Gwaltney Court also reasoned that
Congress' pervasive use of the present tense in section 505 indicated that
Congress intended the citizen suit provision to apply to present and future
violations rather than wholly past violations.4 5 The Court stated that the
language of section 505(a) only requires a citizen-plaintiff to allege that a
defendant is committing an ongoing violation at the time a citizen-plaintiff
files suit for the defendant to violate the Act." The Court explained that

44. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381. In Gwaltney the Supreme Court held that the most
reasonable interpretation of the Clean Water Act indicates that a defendant must be violating
the Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff files suit for a court to have jurisdiction to hear a citizen
suit. Id. First, the Court reasoned that if Congress had intended the Clean Water Act to allow
citizen.plaintiffs to sue for wholly past violations, Congress would have used different language
in § 505. Id.; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting language of § 505(a) of Clean
Water Act). The Court further noted that Congress used the present tense throughout § 505
of the Clean Water Act. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382. For example, the Court referred to the
phrase, "which is in effect", that Congress included in § 505(f)'s requirement that citizens
only may bring suit for violations of a permit limitation. Id. (emphasis added). In addition,
the Supreme Court noted that Congress included the most pervasive use of the present tense
in § 505(g)'s definition of citizen. Id. In § 505(g), Congress defimed citizen as "a person...
having an interest which is or may be adversely affected." Id. (emphasis added). The Gwaltney
Court interpreted Congress' use of the present tense as indicative of Congress' intent that §
505(a) of the Clean Water Act apply to present and future violations rather than past violations.
Id. Second, the Supreme Court noted that the Clean Air Act and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act contain the identical "to be in violation" language found in the Clean Water
Act. Id; see 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1982) (Clean Air Act). The Gwaltney Court stated that the
Clean Air Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act only provide for prospective
relief. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381. The Gwaltney Court, therefore, reasoned that the Clean
Water Act only provides prospective relief. Id. at 382. Third, the Court noted that in the
most recent amendments to the Clean Water Act, Congress did not amend § 505 to allow
citizen-plaintiffs to sue for past violations. Id. at 381 n.2. The Court interpreted Congress'
failure to amend § 505 to support the Court's finding that § 505 allows prospective relief in
citizen suits under the Clean Water Act. Id.; see Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-4, § 314, 101 Stat. 46, 46-48, codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1251-1376 (1986 & West Supp. 1988) (amending §§ of Clean Water Act, but leaving citizen
suit provision in § 505 undisturbed). Fourth, the Supreme Court noted that the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (Waste Disposal Act) expressly allows citizen-plaintiffs to sue for past violations
of the Act. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381 n.2; see 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986) (Solid Waste Disposal Act) (allowing citizen-plaintiffs to sue defendants for past violations). The Gwaltney Court reasoned that if Congress wants citizens to have the power to sue
for past violations, Congress will provide explicit language in the statute. Gwaltney, 108 S.
Ct. at 381. The Court, therefore, reasoned that § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act did not
provide courts with jurisdiction to hear citizen suits based on wholly past violations. Id.
45. See supra note 44 (discussing Gwaltney Court's analysis of Congress' use of present
tense throughout § 505 of Clean Water Act).
46. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381. In addition to the language in § 505(a) of the Clean
Water Act, the Supreme Court also relied on the interrelationship between § 309 and § 505
in interpreting the jurisdictional grant in § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act. Id. at 382; see
infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Supreme Court's analysis of
interrelationship between §§ 309(d) and 505(a) of Clean Water Act).
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ongoing violations consist of either continuing or intermittent violations. 47
The Supreme Court, therefore, reasoned that a plaintiff must show the
existence of a continuing or intermittent violation to establish that a defendant is violating the Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff fies suit.'
In holding that a citizen-plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation of
the Clean Water Act when filing suit against a defendant, the Supreme
Court in Gwaltney also relied on the sixty day notice provision in section
505(b) of the Clean Water Act.49 The Court noted that section 505(b)
requires a citizen-plaintiff to give a defendant sixty days notice of the alleged
violations before filing suit. 0 The Court reasoned that the sixty day notice

would be useless if a citizen-plaintiff could sue for any past violation."
Accordingly, the Gwaltney Court stated that the purpose of the sixty day
notice provision is to provide alleged violators with the opportunity to
comply with the requirements of the Act and avoid needless suits.5 2 The

Gwaltney Court, therefore, concluded that the sixty day notice provision
indicates Congress' intent that section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act only
permit citizen-plaintiffs to sue defendants for ongoing violations rather than
wholly past violations. 53
In addition to construing the language of the Clean Water Act, the

Gwaltney Supreme Court stated that the legislative history of the Act
supported the Court's interpretation of section 505(a).5 4 The Court noted
that the Act's legislative history indicates that Congress included the citizen
suit provision in section 505(a) to reduce or eliminate violations of the Act.55
The Gwaltney Court implied that because a court cannot abate a wholly

47. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381.
48. Id. at 385.
49. Id. at 382-83; see 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1982) (section 505(b) of Clean Water Act).
50. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 383. Contra Miller, supra note 17, at 10101 (proposing different purposes for
60 day notice provision). While the Supreme Court finds that the purpose of the 60 day notice
is to allow violators an opportunity to bring themselves into complete compliance with the
Act and avoid needless suits, one commentator argues that the notice provision serves other
purposes. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382-83 (discussing Court's interpretation of purpose of
60 day notice provision of Clean Water Act). But see Miller, supra note 17, at 10101 (discussing
commentator's interpretation of purposes of 60 day notice provision). The commentator
proposes two alternative purposes of the 60 day notice provision. Miller, supra note 17, at
10101. First, the commentator proposes that the purpose of the 60 day notice provision is to
allow a defendant the opportunity to convince a citizen-plaintiff that a lawsuit is unjustified.
Id. Second, the commentator proposes that the purpose of the 60 day notice provision is to
allow a defendant an opportunity to negotiate with a citizen-plaintiff to settle the issue and
avoid a lawsuit. Id.
53. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382-383.
54. Id. at 383-384; see supra note 9 (discussing legislative history of § 505 of Clean
Water Act); supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text (noting Gwaltney Court's discussion of
language of Clean Water Act); infra notes 54-58 and accompanying text (noting Gwaltney
Court's discussion of legislative history of Clean Water Act).
55. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383; see supra note 9 (discussing legislative history of citizen
suit provision of § 505 of Clean Water Act).
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past violation, the legislative history supported the Court's interpretation of
section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act requiring citizen-plaintiffs to allege
an ongoing violation of the Act. 6 Moreover, the Court stated that the
references in the legislative history to the role of citizen-plaintiffs in enforcing the Act as supplemental to the federal and state enforcement role
supported the Court's interpreting section 505(a) to disallow citizen suits
for wholly past violations.57 The Supreme Court reasoned that if citizenplaintiffs could sue for wholly past violations, citizen suits would intrude
upon the governmental enforcement role and violate Congress' intent.5"
The Supreme Court stated that a court has jurisdiction to hear a citizen
suit so long as a citizen-plaintiff in good faith alleges that a defendant's
violations of the Clean Water Act occurred on or would likely continue
beyond the date the citizen-plaintiff filed suit.5 9 The Court noted that the
"good-faith allegation" standard enables citizen-plaintiffs to file suit without
first proving the ongoing violation.6° While noting that the Act protects
defendants from baseless claims, the Court stated that once a citizen suit
goes to trial, the citizen-plaintiff must prove the allegations in the citizenplaintiff's complaint to prevail.," Because the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney
had not ruled on the district court's alternative finding that the plaintiffs
had alleged in good-faith that the defendant was committing an ongoing
violation of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the Fourth Circuit to decide whether the plaintiffs had proven an ongoing
62
violation of the Act.

In holding that a citizen-plaintiff must allege in good faith an ongoing
violation of the Clean Water Act for a court to have jurisdiction, the

56. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383.
57. Id. at 383; see supra note 10 (discussing legislative history of notice requirement of
citizen suit provision in § 505 of Clean Water Act).
58. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 383.
59. Id. at 385.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 385-86. While the majority in the Gwaltney case held that citizen-plaintiffs
must prove an ongoing violation at trial to succeed on the merits, the Gwaltney concurrence
disagreed with the majority on when citizen-plaintiffs must prove the existence of ongoing
violations. Id. at 387 (Scalia, J., concurring). The concurrence stated that the Clean Water
Act requires citizen-plaintiffs to provide proof of the existence of an ongoing violation of a
defendant before a court has jurisdiction to hear the suit. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The
concurrence interpreted the majority to state that citizen-plaintiffs need not prove the goodfaith allegation of an ongoing violation once the court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Id.
at 386-87. Contra id. at 386 (majority rejecting requirement that plaintiffs-respondents prove
existence of ongoing violations before invoking jurisdiction and holding that plaintiffs-respondents must prove ongoing violations once case proceeds to trial). Rather, the majority requires
the citizen-plaintiff to make a good-faith allegation that the defendant is committing an
ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act for a court to have jurisdiction to hear the case.
Id; see Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 844 F.2d 170, 171 n. 1 (4th
Cir. 1988) (distinguishing majority and concurring opinions in Gwaltney Supreme Court case
concerning when citizen-plaintiff must prove allegations of ongoing violations).
62. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 386.
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Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney resolved the divergent interpretations

of the jurisdictional grant to courts in citizen suits under section 505(a).63
The Supreme Court's construction of section 505, however, raises at least
two issues that the Fourth Circuit and district court on remand in Gwaltney

have addressed and that other courts have begun to address.64 In ruling that
a citizen-plaintiff must allege an ongoing violation, the Gwaltney Supreme
Court did not consider whether a court may impose penalties for precomplaint violations if a citizen-plaintiff proves an ongoing violation of the
Clean Water Act.65 The Gwaltney case holds that courts lack jurisdiction

to hear citizen suits for wholly past violations. 6 Accordingly, the language
of the Court's opinion indicates that a court cannot award- penalties for
wholly past violations unconnected to the violation taking place at the time

the citizen-plaintiff files

suit.67

Courts, however, remain uncertain whether

courts may award penalties for precomplaint violations that comprise the

ongoing violation which supported the jurisdiction for the citizen-plaintiff's
suit.

68

In treating section 505(a) as a provision that grants jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court in Gwaltney seems to imply that once a citizen-plaintiff
proves that a defendant committed an ongoing violation of the Clean Water
Act a court may award penalties for precomplaint violations comprising the
ongoing violation.6 9 The Supreme Court construed the remedies clause in

63. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text (discussing split among jurisdictions in
construing § 505 of Clean Water Act); supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (discussing
holding of Supreme Court in Gwaltney).
64. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381 (holding that citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing
violation for courts to have jurisdiction under § 505); infra notes 65-107 and accompanying
text (discussing issues of penalties for precomplaint violations and when intermittent violations
cease to be intermittent).
65. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 385 (holding that citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing
violation for courts to have jurisdiction under Clean Water Act); infra notes 65-89 and
accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of awarding penalties for precomplaint violations
of Clean Water Act).
66. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney holding that
citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing violation and not wholly past violation for courts to have
jurisdiction under § 505 of Clean Water Act).
67. See supra notes 42-61 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney holding that
citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing violation for courts to have jurisdiction under § 505 of
Clean Water Act).
68. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of courts
awarding penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water Act after
Gwaltney decision); infra notes 69-89 and accompanying text (same); infra note 69 (discussing
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Carter-Wallace, which held that courts may
award penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water Act).
69. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Supreme Court's
analysis of jurisdictional grant to citizen plaintiffs under § 505 of Clean Water Act). But see
Clearwater & DuBoff, supra note 17, at 10125 (interpreting Gwaltney decision to disallow civil
penalties unless injunction is also granted). See also Public Interest Research Group of New
Jersey v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 115, 118 (D. N.J. 1988) (holding that courts may
award penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water Act). For
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section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act with section 505(a), which grants

example, in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Carter-Wallace the defendant
operated a plant that discharged pollutants into a brook under a NPDES permit. CarterWallace, 684 F. Supp. at 116. The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for
New Jersey and alleged that the defendant had violated and was continuing to violate the
effluent limitations in the defendant's NPDES permit. Id. The defendant moved for partial
summary judgment, alleging that the district court did not have jurisdiction to award penalties
for violations of the Clean Water Act that occurred before the plaintiff filed suit. Id. at 11617. The defendant argued that the Gwaltney decision had held that a court could only award
civil penalties against defendants that are subject to an injunction in citizen suits. Id. at 118;
see infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (noting Gwaltney Court's discussion of interrelationship between jurisdictional provision in § 505(a) and penalty provision in § 309(d)). The
defendant reasoned that in Gwaltney the Supreme Court had concluded that Congress authorized citizen suits under the Clean Water Act to address present and future violations rather
than past violations. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 118; see supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Court holding that citizen-plaintiffs must allege ongoing
violation rather than wholly past violation for court to have jurisdiction). Accordingly, the
defendant argued that penalties for precomplaint violations are not appropriate under the
Gwaltney holding. Carter-Wallace,684 F. Supp. at 118; see infranotes 70-77 and accompanying
text (noting Gwaltney Court's discussion of interrelationship between jurisdictional provision
in § 505(a) and penalty provision in § 309(d)). In addition the defendant noted that the
Gwaltney Court held that a citizen-plaintiff may seek civil penalties only in suits in which the
plaintiff seeks to abate ongoing violations. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 118; see supra
notes 42-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney Court holding that citizen-plaintiffs
may file suit only for present and future violations and not wholly past violations). Thus, the
defendant reasoned that a court cannot enjoin violations that the defendant committed before
the plaintiff filed suit. Carter-Wallace,684 F. Supp. at 118. The defendant, therefore, concluded
that a court may award civil penalties only for a defendant's postcomplaint violations. Id.
The New Jersey district court dismissed the defendant's motion and held that citizenplaintiffs may seek civil penalties for precomplaint violations upon showing an ongoing
violation. Id. at 118-19. Finding that the defendant had misread both the Gwaltney decision
and the Clean Water Act, the district court stated that Gwaltney does not limit a court's
authority to award penalties for present and future violations under § 309(d). Id.; see infra
notes 70-81 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney holding and § 505(a) and § 309(d)
of Clean, Water Act). The district court noted that § 505(a) of the Clean Water Act only
establishes the jurisdictional requirement for filing citizen suits. Carter-Wallace,684 F. Supp.
at 118. Once a citizen-plaintiff has satisfied the jurisdictional requirement that citizen-plaintiffs
must allege that defendant is committing an ongoing violation of the Act, the district court
stated that a court may award any appropriate penalty under section 309(d) of the Clean
Water Act. Id. The Carter-Wallacecourt also found support for its interpretation of § 309(d)
and § 505(a) of the Act from the action of the Supreme Court in remanding the Gwaltney
case. Id. at 119; see supra note 62 and accompanying text (stating that Supreme Court
remanded Gwaltney case to Fourth Circuit); infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text (discussing
implications of Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney case to Fourth Circuit). The court noted
that when the Supreme Court remanded the Gwaltney case, the Court was aware that the
Fourth Circuit could award civil penalties only for precomplaint violations because the request
for injunctive relief was not preserved on appeal. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 119; see
infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text (stating that Gwaltney Supreme Court seemed to
have been aware that Fourth Circuit on remand could award penalties only for precomplaint
violations on remand).
In addition to the statutory language of the Clean Water Act and the Supreme Court's
remand of the Gwaltney case, the Carter-Wallace court noted that the Ninth Circuit had
recently decided a case that supported the district court's award of penalties for precomplaint

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:313

jurisdiction to courts under the Act and also authorizes a court to grant
injunctive relief and award penalties under section 309(d).70 Section 309(d)
of the Clean Water Act permits a court to impose civil penalties of $25,000
per day for each violation of the Act and does not distinguish between
precomplaint violations and postcomplaint violations. 7' Under section 505(a),
a court may grant an injunction to provide relief even though a defendant
is not violating the Clean Water Act at the time a citizen-plaintiff files
suit.7 2 A grant of injunctive relief is appropriate as long as a realistic
possibility remains that a defendant's illegal conduct will continue. 73 A
citizen-plaintiff, therefore, may appropriately request a court to grant injunctive relief upon a plaintiff showing that a defendant's ongoing violation
continued when the citizen-plaintiff filed suit.74 In construing section 309

violations in citizen suits under the Clean Water Act. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 119
n.2.; see Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that
five year statute of limitations applies to citizen suits under Clean Water Act). The CarterWallace Court noted that the Chevron court applied a five year statute of limitations to
citizens bringing suit under the Clean Water Act. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 119 n.2.;
see Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1521 (applying five year statute of limitations to citizen suits under
Clean Water Act). The Carter-Wallace court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit would not have
applied a five year statute of limitations if the Clean Water Act did not authorize courts to
award penalties for the precomplaint violations that occurred before the five year statutory
limitation ran. Carter-Wallace, 684 F. Supp. at 119 n.2.; see Chevron, 834 F.2d at 1521
(holding that five year statute of limitations applies to citizen suits under Clean Water Act).
But see Hudson River Fisherman's Ass'n v. County of Westchester, 686 F. Supp. 1044, 1051
n.9. (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (indicating in dicta court's uncertainty that Clean Water Act authorizes
courts to award penalties for precomplaint violations).
70. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381-82; see supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting
language of § 505(a) of Clean Water Act); infra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing §
309(d) and § 505(a) of Clean Water Act).
71. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a) (1982). In addition to § 309(d), § 505(a) of the Clean Water
Act authorizes a court to award civil penalties and to grant an injunction against a violator
of the Act. Id. at § 1365(a). Congress amended the Clean Water Act in 1987 by increasing
penalties from $10,000 per violation to $25,000 per day for each violation. See Watr Quality
Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-4, § 314, 101 Stat. 46, 46-48, (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.A.
§ 1319(d) (1986 & West Supp. 1988)) (containing 1987 amendments to Clean Water Act).
Courts must award any civil penalties imposed against a defendant in a citizen suit to the
federal government, rather than the citizen-plaintiff. See Sierra Club v. Simkins Indus., 847
F.2d 1109, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that defendants in citizen suits pay civil penalties to
United States Department of the Treasury); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982) (providing penalty
provision of Clean Water Act).
72. See Board of Public Instruction of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d. 693, 699700 (Fla. 1969) (holding that courts may enjoin anticipated future wrongs). See generally 43
C.J.S. Injunctions § 22 (1978) (stating that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent future
wrongs if court finds that reasonable probability exists that future injury will occur unless
court enjoins activity).
73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of injunctive
relief when reasonable probability exists of future harm).
74. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (stating that injunctions are appropriate
when a reasonable probability exists of future harm); infra note 91 and accompanying text
(stating Gwaltney holding that defines ongoing violation of Clean Water Act as reasonable
likelihood that violations will continue in future).
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together with section 505 of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court seems

to reason that a citizen-plaintiff may seek penalties only if the citizen-

plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is appropriate. 5 The Supreme Court's
language in Gwaltney, however, does not imply that courts must issue an
injunction before they are permitted to assess penalties. 76 Thus, as long as

a citizen-plaintiff's injunction request is appropriate when the citizen-plaintiff files suit, a court may apply civil penalties even though the court later
77
decides not to grant an injunction.

In addition to the Gwaltney Supreme Court's implicit approval of courts

awarding precomplaint penalties, the language of the Clean Water Act
supports awarding precomplaint penalties in citizen suits. 78 As a jurisdictional
grant, section 505(a) states that once a citizen-plaintiff has established
jurisdiction, a court may enforce the requirements of the Act by granting
injunctive relief and by applying any civil penalty under section 309(d) of

the Clean Water Act. 79 The language of section 309(d) and section 505(a)
together impliedly authorize a court to award penalties for precomplaint
violations comprising the ongoing violation that supported jurisdiction. 0

75. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 382 (holding that citizen-plaintiffs may seek penalties
only in suit brought to enjoin violations); supra note 9 and accompanying text (quoting
language of § 505(a) of Clean Water Act); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 309(d) of Clean Water Act).
76. See supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (discussing language of Gwaltney
decision concerning penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water
Act); infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text (analyzing whether § 309(d) and § 505(a) of
Clean Water Act authorize penalties for precomplaint violations).
The language that courts have used in the opinions of other cases involving citizen suits
under the Clean Water Act also indicates that courts may award penalties for precomplaint
violations. See Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
plaintiff must prove existence of ongoing permit violations or likelihood that defendant would
continue to violate the permit before court may assess penalties for past violations); Sierra
Club v. Simkins Indus., 847 F.2d 1109, 1115-1116 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that defendant
committed continuing violations, court imposed penalties for precomplaint violations); Sierra
Club v. Chevron U.S.A., 834 F.2d 1517, 1521 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that five year statute
of limitations applies to bringing citizen suits under Clean Water Act); supra note 69 (discussing
Carter-Wallace case, which held that courts can award penalties for precomplant violations
in citizen suits under § 505 of Clean Water Act).
77. See supra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of penalties
for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under § 505(a) of Clean Water Act, even if
injunction is no longer appropriate).
78. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing how language of Gwaltney
holding supports awarding penalties for precomplaint violations in § 505(a) citizen suits); supra
note 71 and accompanying text (discussing penalties provision of Clean Water Act); infra notes
79-81 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Water Act's language implying support for
awarding penalties for precomplaint violations).
79. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1982) (section 505 of Clean Water Act grants jurisdiction
to courts to hear citizen suits); supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing penalties
provision of Clean Water Act).
80. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(d), 1365(a) (1982); supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text
(discussing provisions of Clean Water Act that support courts awarding penalties for precomplaint violations); infra note 81 and accompanying text (same).
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Construing section 309 and section 505 of the Clean Water Act together to
authorize courts to award penalties for precomplaint violations is consistent
with the Gwaltney Court's holding because the Supreme Court only analyzed
section 505 as a jurisdictional grant and did not discuss when a court may
award civil penalties. 8'
The Court's remand of Gwaltney to the Fourth Circuit seems to suggest
that the Court would construe section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act with
section 505(a) and uphold penalties for precomplaint violations comprising

the ongoing violation. 2 Before the Supreme Court heard the Gwaltney case,
the district court had imposed penalties against the defendant, but the

district court had not issued an injunction against the defendant."3 Thus,
when the Supreme Court remanded the Gwaltney case to the Fourth Circuit,
the Court appears to have recognized that the Fourth Circuit could award

only penalties because the plaintiffs-appellees had not preserved the issue
of injunction on appeal.Y The Fourth Circuit only could award penalties

for precomplaint violations because the defendant-appellant's last violation
occurred before the plaintiffs-appellees filed suit.8 5 Accordingly, the remand
action of the Supreme Court in Gwaltney suggests that penalties for precomplaint violations are appropriate if a citizen-plaintiff shows that the
defendant was committing an ongoing violation at the time the citizenplaintiff filed suit.86
If a court construed section 309(d) to limit penalties to violations
occurring on or after the date a citizen-plaintiff files suit, the penalties
provision does not seem to provide an incentive for a defendant to comply

81. See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text (discussing § 309 and § 505 of Clean
Water Act and analyzing Gwaltney Supreme Court holding, which impliedly supports courts
awarding penalties for precomplaint violations).
82. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 386
(1987) (remanding Gwaltney case to Fourth Circuit for reconsideration); supra note 69 and
accompanying text (discussing Carter-Wallace case); infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text
(discussing how Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney case impliedly supports awarding
penalties for precomplaint violations).
83. Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542, 1565
(E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987); see supra
note 69 and accompanying text (discussing Carter-Wallace case).
84. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 380 (indicating Supreme Court's awareness in Gwaltney
of procedural posture and remedy district court granted to plaintiffs in Gwaltney); supra note
69 and accompanying text (discussing Carter-Wallace case).
85. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 379 (indicating that Supreme Court in Gwaltney knew
that defendant-petitioner's last violation of Clean Water Act occurred before plaintiffsrespondents filed suit); supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing last violation in
Gwaltney case, which occurred one month before plaintiffs filed suit); supra note 69 and
accompanying text (discussing Carter-Wallace case).
86. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct at 386 (remanding of Gwaltney case to Fourth Circuit);
supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing Carter-Wallacecase); supra notes 82-85 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's remand of Gwaltney case); Chesapeake Bay
Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (E.D. Va. 1988) (reinstating
on remand in Gwaltney previous judgment composed entirely of penalties for precomplaint
violations).
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with the Act.87 Accordingly, a defendant could avoid any penalty under the
citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act by complying with the Clean
Water Act on the day the citizen-plaintiff files suit.88 Therefore, for the
penalty provision in the Clean Water Act to have any useful purpose in
citizen suits, the provision must permit courts to award penalties for
precomplaint violations. 9
In addition to the confusion the Supreme Court's decision has created
for courts in deciding whether they may award penalties in citizen suits, a
second ambiguity the Gwaltney holding has created concerns when an
intermittent violation ceases to be intermittent and becomes a wholly past
violation. 90 In describing an intermittent violation, the Supreme Court did
not explain fully what the Court meant by stating that a citizen-plaintiff
establishes an intermittent violation if a reasonable likelihood remains that
the defendant will continue to violate the Clean Water Act. 9' The Gwaltney
Court, however, did state that an intermittent violator is a person who
violates the Act once every three months. 92 Accordingly, for a court to
know when jurisdiction is proper in a citizen suit, the court must resolve
how much time must pass between violations so that a reasonable likelihood
of future violations no longer remains and the violation becomes wholly
past.

93

While the Supreme Court did not resolve the question of when an
intermittent violation ceases, on remand the Fourth Circuit in Gwaltney
established guidelines to assist courts in determining when violations constitute ongoing (continuing or intermittent) violations. 94 First, the Fourth

87. Cf. supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing uselessness of 60 day notice
provision if citizen-plaintiffs could sue for wholly past violations).
88. Cf. supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text (discussing uselessness of 60 day notice
provision if citizen-plaintiffs could sue for wholly past violations).
89. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (discussing uselessness of civil penalty
provision for citizen suits if courts could not award civil penalties for precomplaint violations);
supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing language of Clean Water Act and Gwaltney
Court's treatment of § 309(d) and § 505(a)).
90. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381 (holding that citizen-plaintiffs must allege an ongoing
violation of Clean Water Act for courts to have jurisdiction under Clean Water Act); supra
notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing appropriateness of penalties for precomplaint
violations under Clean Water Act after Gwaltney decision); infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing factors courts have used to decide when intermittent violation ceases to
be intermittent and becomes wholly past violation).
91. See Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 381 (holding that intermittent violation involves a
reasonable likelihood that the violator will continue to violate the Clean Water Act); supra
notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney holding that citizen-plaintiffs may
show ongoing violation by adducing evidence of either intermittent or continuing violation).
92. Gwaltney, 108 S. Ct. at 384.
93. See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (citing cases that outline factors which
indicate when intermittent violation of Clean Water Act ceases and becomes wholly past
violation).
94. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 844 F.2d 170, 172 (4th
Cir. 1988) (delineating factors for courts to use in determining when intermittent violation
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Circuit stated that a citizen-plaintiff may show a continuing violation
through evidence that the defendant is violating the Act on or after the day
the citizen-plaintiff files suit.9 Second, the Fourth Circuit stated that a
citizen-plaintiff may show an intermittent violation by presenting evidence
in which a court could reasonably find that a defendant would continue to
violate the Clean Water Act in the future.96 The Fourth Circuit explained
that intermittent violations are ongoing violations until no likelihood remains
that the defendant will violate the Act again. 97 The Fourth Circuit further
clarified the meaning of intermittent violation by delineating factors for
courts to consider in deciding whether an intermittent violation remains at
the time a citizen-plaintiff files suit.9 First, the Fourth Circuit stated that
a court should consider the efforts that the violator has taken to correct
the problems in the waste treatment system that caused the prior violations. 9
Second, the Fourth Circuit stated that a court should consider the probability
that the efforts the violator took to remedy the problems in the system will
be effective in preventing future violations.'00 Finally, the Fourth Circuit
stated that a court should consider any and all other evidence relevant to

exists); infra notes 95-101 and accompanying text (outlining factors for courts to consider in
determining whether intermittent violation exists). Other courts also have adopted the guidelines
the Fourth Circuit set forth in Gwaltney for determining when an intermittent violation exists.
See Sierra Club v. Union Oil, 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988) (adopting guidelines of Fourth
Circuit in Gwaltney for determining when intermittent violation exists); Gwaltney of Smithfield,
Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 688 F. Supp. 1078, 1078-1080 (E.D. Va. 1988) (holding of
district court on remand in Gwaltney, applying and expanding Fourth Circuit's guidelines for
determining when intermittent violation exists). For example, the district court in Gwaltney on
further remand, applied the factors that the Fourth Circuit had delineated on remand in
Gwaltney for determining when an intermittent violation of the Clean Water Act exists.
Gwaltney, 688 F. Supp. at 1079. On remand in Gwaltney, the district court found that the
plaintiffs had proved at trial that the defendant had committed an ongoing violation. Id. at
1080. In applying the factors that the Fourth Circuit had set forth in Gwaltney, the district
court recognized that the defendant had made efforts to correct the problems at the plant. Id.
at 1079. The court, however, was not convinced of the effectiveness of the defendant's efforts
in preventing future violations. Id. In concluding that an ongoing violation existed at the time
the plaintiffs in Gwaltney filed suit, the district court indicated additional factors for courts
to apply in deciding when an intermittent violation exists. Id. at 1079-1080. First, the district
court indicated that courts should consider the number and severity of the defendant's past
violations. Id. Moreover, the court indicated that courts should consider both the amount of
time between each of the violations that took place before plaintiffs filed suit and the amount
of time between the defendant's last violation and the day the plaintiffs filed the complaint.
Id. Second, the district court indicated that courts should consider the capabilities of the
defendant's plant and water treatment system to adequately handle the amounts and kinds of
waste in the treatment system. Id. at 1079 n.2. Third, the district court indicated that courts
may consider evidence concerning the priority a defendant places on complying with the
defendant's NPDES permit. Id.
95. Gwaltney, 844 F.2d at 171.
96. Id. at 171-172.
97. Id. at 172.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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whether a defendant has eliminated completely the risk of future violations
at the time a citizen-plaintiff filed suit.10
While the Fourth Circuit's guidelines will facilitate a court's analysis in
deciding when an intermittent violation ceases to be intermittent and becomes
wholly past, other courts have enunciated additional factors that a court
should consider.10 2 Because the factors set forth thus far do not appear to
contradict each other, lawyers may use them as a guide in advising their
corporate clients how to avoid violating the Clean Water Act. 03 Depending
on the permit requirements, the type of permit holder, and the particular
pollutants involved, however, the time in which an intermittent violation
becomes a wholly past violation will vary.104 Accordingly, the flexible
standard the Supreme Court set forth in Gwaltney provides courts with an
accommodating standard to apply in various situations.10 5 The Supreme
Court seems to have adopted a reasonableness standard to provide courts
with a flexible standard to apply to determine when a violation is an
intermittent violation.1 6 Until the Supreme Court offers further guidance,
the factors that the Supreme Court and the Fourth Circuit delineated in
Gwaltney, as well as factors other courts have delineated, provide a framework to resolve a particular controversy and to further refine the meaning
of intermittent violation107
In Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation the Supreme
Court held that a citizen-plaintiff must allege in good faith that a defendant
is committing an ongoing violation of the Clean Water Act for a court to
have jurisdiction under section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act. 0 8 While the
Supreme Court's decision in Gwaltney appears to represent a victory for
NPDES permit holders, the Court's decision provides courts with consid-

101. Id.; see supra note 94 (citing cases that delineate additional factors for courts to
apply in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney).
102. See supra note 94 (citing cases that delineate additional factors for courts to apply
in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney).
103. See supra note 94 (citing cases that delineate additional factors for courts to apply
in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney); supra notes 90-93 and
accompanying text (discussing ambiguity Gwaltney decision has created in defining intermittent
violation).
104. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing various factors for court
to apply in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney).
105. See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text (discussing various factors for courts
to consider in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney); supra notes
90-92 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity in Supreme Court's ruling in Gwaltney
describing intermittent violations).
106. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's ruling in
Gwaltney describing intermittent violations).
107. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility Gwaltney
decision allows courts in determining when intermittent violations exist). Cf. Powers, supra
note 17, at 10121 (indicating that courts rarely will decide whether violation is intermittent
violation because most citizen suits involve violators who continue to violate Clean Water Act
after citizen-plaintiff files suit).
108. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 108 S. Ct. 376, 381 (1987).
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erable discretion to find that a citizen-plaintiff in good faith has alleged a
continuing or intermittent violation in the citizen-plaintiffs' complaint.' 9
Accordingly, most courts will find that the court has jurisdiction to hear
citizen suits.11o In addition, the vagueness of the term "intermittent violation" provides courts with the discretion to rule in favor of citizen-plaintiffs
and hold defendant's liable for violations of the Clean Water Act.'
Moreover, a court's ability to award penalties for precomplaint violations
once a citizen-plaintiff has proven an ongoing violation improves the court's
ability to sanction polluters." 2 The ability of courts to award penalties for
precomplaint violations also deters defendants from violating the Clean
Water Act before the citizen-plaintiff files suit." 3 Thus, the future decisions
of courts may very well prove that the apparent victory which Gwaltney
114
gave to NPDES permit holders is more illusory than real.
JOEL A. WAiTE

109. See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (discussing Gwaltney holding that
citizen-plaintiffs cannot bring suit under Clean Water Act for wholly past violation, but must
show ongoing violation); supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (discussing flexibility of
factors courts can apply in determining whether intermittent violation exists under Gwaltney).
110. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text (noting Gwaltney Supreme Court's
holding that citizen-plaintiffs only required to allege in good faith ongoing violation and need
not prove ongoing violation until suit is heard at trial on merits).
111. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (implying that factors which courts
have delineated to determine whether intermittent violation exists provide courts with discretion
to find that intermittent violation exists in most instances).
112. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing apparent ability of courts
to award penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water Act).
113. See supra notes 65-89 and accompanying text (discussing apparent ability of courts
to award penalties for precomplaint violations in citizen suits under Clean Water Act).
114. See supra notes 109-113 and accompanying text (discussing discretion left to courts
in citizens suits as result of Gwaltney Supreme Court decision).

